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NATURALIZING MORAL JUDGMENT 
ABSTRACT  
Philosophers have traditionally attempted to solve metaethical disputes about the nature 
of moral judgment through reasoned argument alone. Empirical evidence about how we 
do make moral judgments is often overlooked in these debates. In the wake of recent 
discoveries in cognitive neuroscience and experimental psychology, however, some 
empirically-minded philosophers are beginning to use neural findings in support of their 
theories of moral judgment. The intent of this thesis is to explore how this empirical 
evidence can be integrated effectively into philosophical discussions about moral 
judgment. In the first chapter of my thesis, I review the moral judgment debate in both 
philosophy and moral psychology, focusing specifically on contemporary sentimentalist 
solutions to this problem. This review sets the stage for my critique of Prinz’s 
sentimentalist account of moral judgment in the second chapter. I argue that Prinz uses 
neural evidence to support his sentimentalist thesis inappropriately, altering the evidence 
to fit his theory, rather than using the evidence to inform his theory. In the third chapter, I 
examine Prinz’s somatic theory of emotion and how this is related to his theory of moral 
judgment.  I argue that neural evidence indicates that a theory of emotion that 
incorporates aspects of both cognitive appraisal and somatic theories is more empirically 
accurate than either view in isolation. Finally, I discuss the implications that a neural 
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Introduction  
Philosophers have traditionally tried to solve metaethical disputes about the nature of 
moral judgment through reasoned argument alone. Empirical evidence about how we do 
make moral judgments has typically been overlooked in these debates. Recently, 
however, some important discoveries have been made in cognitive neuroscience about 
the neural underpinnings of moral judgment. Many empirically-minded philosophers are 
starting to take these findings into consideration when formulating their arguments. The 
general intent of this thesis is to explore how neuroscientific information is being 
integrated into theories of moral judgment, to evaluate how effective these findings are in 
supporting theories of moral judgment, and to explain how neuroscience has the power to 
impact future metaethical debates about the nature of moral judgment.    
 I will open my thesis with a brief, but necessary explanation of the historical 
metaethical debate over moral judgment in both philosophy and moral psychology. On 
one side of the debate are the rationalists, who argue that our judgments are ultimately 
grounded in reason. Challenging this rationalist claim are the sentimentalists, who 
consider our judgments to be fundamentally emotional. After surveying the history of the 
debate, I will move forward to describe how this debate is playing out amongst 
sentimentalists in contemporary metaethical circles. There is presently a deep divide 
within sentimentalism itself over the nature of the relationship between our emotions and 
our judgments. I will discuss both the cognitivist view that our moral judgments express 
beliefs about our sentiments as well as the non-cognitivist view that our moral judgments 
function simply to express our sentiments. I will then move forward to discuss the 
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“conflation problem” (D’arms and Jacobson 2000), which is an interesting difficulty that 
many contemporary sentimentalists, cognitivist and non-cognitivist alike, are faced with. 
 Explaining the history of the moral judgment debate is needed to set the stage for 
my examination of Jesse Prinz’s (2006) sentimentalist theory of moral judgment in the 
second chapter of my thesis. Prinz’s theory has been selected because it exemplifies a 
growing trend in metaethical research. This trend is to integrate empirical evidence from 
experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience with one’s theoretical intuitions in 
order to present a strong, empirically plausible theory. After giving a brief overview of 
Prinz’s position, I will argue that the empirical data he cites is incapable of supporting his 
sentimentalist view. I will argue further that Prinz’s view nonetheless reveals some 
important clues as to how empirical data can effectively be integrated into future 
discussions about moral judgment. 
 In my final chapter, I will argue that Prinz’s sentimentalist theory does not fail 
merely because he uses empirical evidence ineffectively, but also as result of the view of 
emotion that underlies his theory. I will examine the finer points of Prinz’s somatic view 
of emotion before moving on to discuss cognitive appraisal theories of emotion and 
somatic theories of emotion more generally. I will argue that theorists on both sides of the 
moral judgment debate have misconstrued what emotion is. I will then propose that a 
theory of emotional consciousness that integrates elements from cognitive appraisal 
theories with elements from somatic theories is a more neurally plausible alternative than 
either theory in isolation.  
 My paper will conclude with a discussion of how an empirically informed, 
integrative theory of emotion could influence future metaethical debates about the nature 
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of moral judgment. My discussion will focus on the idea that, when used effectively, 
empirical evidence from cognitive neuroscience and experimental psychology has the 
potential to drive philosophical discussions of moral judgment forward. Progress, 
however, will be made at the expense of giving up some of our more dogmatic 
philosophical beliefs about reason, emotion, and moral judgment in general.    
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Chapter 1: Metaethical Views of Moral Judgment 
Before I discuss Prinz’s view in more detail, it will be helpful if I provide an outline of 
the metaethical debate that Prinz is entering into. I have included a chart that may make 
reading through the often confusing metaethical material slightly easier (see Figure 1 
below). I will open this section with an overview of the traditional debate in both 
philosophy and moral psychology over the nature of moral judgment. On one side of this 
debate are the rationalists, who hold that we arrive at our judgments through reason 
alone. Sentimentalists, on the other hand, argue that our judgments are fundamentally 
emotional. Next, I will move forward to discuss the current debate between the 
sentimentalists who endorse a cognitivist view of moral judgment, such as David 
Wiggins and John McDowell, and those sentimentalists who argue in favour of non-
cognitivism, such as Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn. Although the views of 
Wiggins and McDowell are at odds with those of Gibbard and Blackburn, I argue that all 
of these theories are plagued by a common problem. According to D’arms and Jacobson 
(2000), these contemporary sentimentalist theories are all vulnerable to the “conflation 
problem.” I will conclude this section by explaining what the conflation problem amounts 
to and by detailing how Prinz’s sentimentalist account of moral judgment is directed 
specifically at avoiding this neo-sentimentalist difficulty. 
 
1.1 Moral Judgment in Philosophy 
 
The traditional debate in philosophy over the nature of moral judgment is between the 
rationalists and the sentimentalists. Moral rationalism stresses, in some way or another, 
our ability to grasp moral principles through a priori reason. Though the moral principle 
in question is often considered objective by rationalists, this need not be the case. Moral  
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judgments such as “X is bad” or “X is wrong,” therefore, result when subjects deem “X” 
to be wrong through the use of reason or introspection alone.  
Consider, for example, the Platonic view. Plato (1991) contends that the human 
soul is composed of three separate parts: reason, emotion, and appetite. In the majority of 
individuals, emotion or appetite will rule their character. Their moral judgments and 
decision-making will be guided by emotional and appetitive drives and they will aim at 
fulfilling their immediate desires. In a minority of cases, however, reason will exert 
control over emotion and desire. Only then will the individual be rendered capable of 
recognizing objective moral values (i.e., the Form of the Good) and consequently making 
moral judgments guided by these objective reasons.   
On the Platonic view, reason and emotion are taken to be distinct and conflicting 
human faculties. Like a charioteer and his horses, reason must reign in and rule emotion 
by whatever means necessary (Plato 2005). It is only when reason exerts control over this 
faculty that the soul is in harmony and the individual is capable of making appropriate 
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moral judgments. Emotion impedes the ability to recognize and act in accord with moral 
values, if it is not overruled.    
 If Plato exemplifies classical rationalism, then Epicurus should be considered to 
exemplify classical sentimentalism. Sentimentalism, recall, views moral judgments as 
fundamentally emotional. Judgments like “X is wrong” or “X is bad” are not arrived at 
through reason or an a priori grasp of some objective moral norm, but rather, through a 
negative emotional reaction to “X”. Hence, “X” is bad only insofar as it elicits a negative 
emotional response from an observer. Epicurus affirms this, arguing that sensation and 
emotion are the only standards by which we are able to make proper judgments 
(Diogenes Laertius 1925). On the Epicurean account, something is good if it elicits 
pleasure in the body or soul and bad if it elicits pain. Pleasure, says Epicurus, “is our first 
and kindred good. It is the starting point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it 
we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good 
thing” (Diogenes Laertius 1925, p. 655).  
  Epicurus additionally argues, contrary to Plato, that reason and emotion, though 
distinct, need not be opposed to one another. Instead, emotion and sensation can help to 
inform our beliefs and choices. They direct us towards reasonable judgments, rather than 
away from them. Emotion, moreover, provides a standard by which we can evaluate our 
judgments post hoc. Any moral judgment that, upon reflection, produces pleasure and 
prevents pain is admirable (Diogenes Laertius 1925). 
Plato’s rationalist views had a profound influence on the Stoics, Medieval 
thinkers such as Anselm, Augustine, and Aquinas, and 17th century continental 
philosophers such as Leibniz and Descartes. Epicurus’ sentimentalism inspired writers 
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such as Diogenes Laertius and Lucretius in the 3rd century CE and the 1st century BCE 
respectively. Throughout the Medieval period, Epicurean sentimentalism lost popularity 
because this materialist view conflicted with popular Christian doctrine. The view was 
revived, however, by Gassendi in the 17th century and later by 18th century Scottish 
philosophers such as Hume and Smith. Hume and Smith, like their Epicurean 
predecessors, argued that judging something morally wrong depends on the presence of a 
sentiment of disapproval towards that thing. Thus to judge, for instance, that murder is 
wrong, is simply to have a sentiment of disapproval (e.g., guilt, remorse, anger, and so 
forth) towards murder.  
Hume agrees with the ethical writers before him that reason and emotion are 
distinct capacities. He does not, however, agree with the rationalist view that they conflict 
with one another. Only an emotion can conflict with a contrary emotion, not a belief 
(Hume 1967). Moral judgment, for Hume, is fundamentally emotional. When we 
experience a sentiment of approval or disapproval towards something, we become aware 
of a particular moral duty to either endorse or condemn that thing. Moreover, this 
sentiment intrinsically motivates us to act in accord with the duty. Reason, Hume 
explains, plays only an instrumental role in moral judgment, indicating what the best 
means are for carrying out our emotionally determined ends. Reason, as he puts it, “is, 
and ought to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than 
to serve and obey them” (Hume 1967, p. 415). 
Smith likewise considers moral judgment to be essentially emotional. His account 
of moral judgment, however, focuses more on sympathy. For Smith, moral judgments are 
grounded in our ability to feel sympathetic towards others. Thus to judge that “X” is 
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wrong is to judge that if we were in the agent’s position, we would judge “X” wrong. A 
moral judgment is appropriate insofar as the emotion anticipated by the individual 
making the judgment is analogous to the emotional felt by the agent. In Smith’s words 
(1971, p. 22): 
When the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect 
concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to 
this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when, 
upon bringing the case home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide with 
what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and improper, and unsuitable 
to the causes which excite them. To approve of the passions of another, therefore, 
as suitable to their objects, is the same thing as to observe that we entirely 
sympathize with them; and not to approve of them as such, is the same thing as to 
observe that we do not entirely sympathize with them. 
 
Hume’s and Smith’s sentimentalist views were sharply criticized by Kant. 
According to Kant’s rationalist theory, emotion has no role in moral judgment. Rather, 
we become aware of moral values by applying the “categorical imperative.” While Kant 
specifies a number of different formulations of the imperative, the most common 
formulation involves the instruction to “act only according to that maxim whereby you 
can at the same time will that it should become a moral law” (1993, p. 421). For any 
given action, then, if you affirmatively judge that its universal acceptance ought to be 
endorsed, that action is morally good. Simply recognizing the objective value of the 
action will provide intrinsic motivation to see the act through, so long as the individual is 
conducting himself rationally. 
As a reaction to Kant’s thoroughly rational deontological theory, Bentham and 
Mill revived Epicureanism in their doctrine of utility. Utilitarianism, explains Mill, 
“holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as 
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the 
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absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure” (Mill 2001, p. 7). 
The utilitarians believe, contrary to Kant, that the means taken to achieve some end are 
morally irrelevant (Mill 2001). As long as the consequences of an action, “X”, result in a 
greater proportion of pleasure than pain, then “X” ought to be judged morally admirable, 
irrespective of the motive involved. Hence for utilitarians, moral judgment is sentimental 
insofar as we rely on our emotions to reveal those things that are pleasurable and those 
things that inflict pain. 
 
1.2 Moral Judgment in Psychology 
Psychological accounts of moral judgment have a considerably shorter history than their 
philosophical counterparts. This is largely due to the fact that philosophy and psychology 
were considered one and the same discipline until the late 19th century. The disagreement 
between those who consider moral judgment to be fundamentally cognitive and those 
who see moral judgment as essentially emotional carried over into the field of 
psychology.  
One of the first psychologists to write extensively about moral judgment is Piaget. 
His belief is that moral judgment is essentially cognitive. Piaget (1948) argues that there 
is a parallel between moral and intellectual development. We learn moral norms in the 
same way that we learn logical norms, through reason. The acquisition of moral norms 
takes place in two stages: constraint and cooperation. First, as children, we are faced with 
moral constraint from adults in positions of authority, such as parents or teachers. This 
constraint leads to heteronomy and consequently to moral realism. Second, after moral 
rules become interiorised and generalized, we move to a cooperative stage. Cooperation 
leads to autonomy. At this stage we formulate moral judgments and act purely out of 
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respect for the moral rules themselves, instead of out of respect for a person who wields 
authority.   
.  Inspired by Piaget’s study of moral development, Kohlberg (1971) devised a more 
substantial account of how moral judgment becomes increasingly sophisticated as 
children mature into adults. Kohlberg argues that there are six distinct levels of moral 
development and that these fall under the scope of preconventional, conventional, or 
postconventional understandings of morality. At the preconventional level, children 
respond to cultural labels of right and wrong, but they interpret these values in terms of 
the consequences that will arise if they are carried out. During this stage, children are 
primarily concerned with avoiding punishment or receiving praise for their actions and 
their moral judgments will reflect these aims. At the conventional level, individuals are 
more concerned with fulfilling the expectations of their community. These expectations 
are perceived as valuable in their own right, regardless of any immediate or obvious 
consequences. Not only does the individual aim to conform to personal and societal 
expectations, but he also will actively maintain, support, and justify them, and will 
identify with the group or individual responsible for generating the expectations. Finally, 
at the postconventional level, the individual is concerned with defining moral values that 
are valid and applicable in an autonomous sense. That is, the individual conceives of 
moral values holding irrespective of the groups or individuals who hold the values in 
esteem, and independent of the individual’s self-identification with these groups. 
 Kohlberg’s theory of moral judgment is purely rational in the following sense. At 
the preconventional, conventional, and postconventional stages of morality, moral 
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judgments are the result of pure, cognitive reflection. In Kohlberg’s words (1971, p. 230-
31), 
…the moral force in personality is cognitive. Affective forces are involved in 
moral decisions, but affect is neither moral nor immoral. When the affective 
arousal is channelled into moral directions, it is moral; when it is not so 
channelled, it is not. The moral channelling mechanisms themselves are cognitive.  
 
Kohlberg additionally notes that the idea that moral judgments are difficult as a result of 
the conflict between cognition and emotion is misleading. On his account, individuals fail 
to uphold moral values not because their ability to restrain their emotional impulses is 
weak, but rather because their cognitive definition of right and wrong is less independent 
of what other people think (Kohlberg 1971). That is, they have yet to reach the most 
advanced, postconventional stage of moral judgment where moral values are defended 
and upheld in their own right.  
Though Kohlberg is a rationalist about moral judgment, his former colleague, 
Carol Gilligan, argues that moral judgment, particularly in women, is typically emotional. 
Gilligan develops this argument after noticing that women rarely progress past the 
conventional stage of morality on Kohlberg’s scale. The reason that women fail to reach 
the post-conventional level, explains Gilligan, is because Kohlberg has mistakenly 
conflated the moral development of men and women (1982). Kohlberg fails to realize that 
the ethical thought of men and women develop in very distinct ways. Gilligan agrees that 
a man’s moral development is typically grounded in an ideal of impartial justice. A 
woman’s moral development, however, is grounded in responsibility and caring 
relationships. She explains that women construe the moral problem “…as a problem of 
care and responsibility in relationships rather than as one of rights and rules”. This “ties 
the development of their moral thinking to changes in their understanding of 
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responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as justice ties 
development to the logic of equality and reciprocity” (Gilligan 1982, p.72). Women are 
thus more likely to base their moral judgments on their feelings, whereas men tend to 
base their moral judgments on abstract moral norms.  
While Gilligan’s sentimentalism applies strictly to women, other writers in the 
“ethics of care” tradition extend their theories to men as well. For instance, Nel Noddings 
and Peta Bowden argue that both women’s and men’s moral judgments are a product of 
our care and concern for the well-being of others (Noddings 1984, Bowden 1997). 
 
1.3 The Contemporary Sentimentalist Debate 
Sentimentalist accounts of moral judgment are popular in both contemporary philosophy 
and moral psychology. In philosophy, this is because sentimentalists have an easier time 
accounting for moral motivation than rationalists do. For the sentimentalist, emotions 
have the intrinsic power to motivate people to act in accord with their moral judgments. 
A judgment is thus causally connected to the corresponding action. Moreover, 
sentimentalism is consistent with the view that moral values do not have an independent 
existence, but rather, in some way, depend on us for their value (D’arms and Jacobson 
2000). In moral psychology, sentimentalist accounts of judgment are strengthened by 
neural evidence showing that emotional brain areas are activated when individuals make 
moral judgments (Greene and Haidt 2002).  
In what remains of this section, I would like to explore a series of contemporary 
sentimentalist views of moral judgment. These views are sometimes called 
“neosentimentalist” in the metaethical literature (D’arms and Jacobson 2000, Prinz 2006). 
They are sentimentalist insofar as they consider our moral judgments fundamentally 
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emotional, yet they deviate from simple sentimentalist theories, since they demand that 
our sentiments be appropriate or warranted in some way. I think it is important to 
investigate the ongoing debate between two factions of neosentimentalist writers, the 
cognitivists and the non-cognitivists, since Prinz formulates his sentimentalist theory with 
this particular dispute in mind.  
 On Prinz’s understanding, simple sentimentalist theories are those that take the 
judgment “X is wrong” as simply having a sentiment of disapprobation towards X. 
Although Prinz uses Hume’s position as an example of simple sentimentalism, I believe 
that Hume’s view is more complex than Prinz accounts for. It should thus be noted that 
when I use the term “simple sentimentalism,” I am not referring to Hume’s position, but 
rather to any sentimentalist theory which equates moral judgment with the experience of 
a sentiment of approval or disapproval.  
Simple sentimentalist theories are traditionally criticized for two reasons (D’arms 
and Jacobson, 2000). First, they are incapable of accounting for moral disagreement. That 
is, they cannot explain why we spend time passionately debating morality if the judgment 
“X is wrong” simply amounts to “I disapprove of X.” Our judgments should be equally 
correct if all they amount to is a description of our mental states. This problem is taken 
care of easily enough by expressivism or emotivism, which take the judgment “X is 
wrong” to be an expression of the mental state of disapproval (see, for instance, Ayer 
1956). Moral disagreement thus becomes a disagreement over moral attitudes. Debates 
about our moral judgments can be understood as attempts to influence the attitudes of 
others (D’arms and Jacobson 2000). 
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 The second problem, encountered by sentimentalist and expressivist theories 
alike, is that if negative evaluations of something are taken as expressions of our attitudes 
of disapproval, then the theory will have no way of distinguishing between negative 
concepts (e.g., wrong, harmful, ugly, shameful, disgusting, etc.) even though these 
concepts are importantly different. This problem is dealt with easily enough as long as 
the sentimentalist distinguishes between particular kinds of disapproval each of which 
will have a certain emotion that corresponds to it. If this answer is accepted, however, 
both the sentimentalist and the expressivist are forced to address a much more 
challenging problem. The new difficulty is that we do not necessarily need to feel a 
sentiment in order to make the judgment associated with it. Moreover, we can reject 
judgments, even while experiencing the corresponding sentiment. It is thus neither 
necessary nor sufficient that we be in the relevant emotional state required to make the 
related judgment (D’arms and Jacobson 2000). 
The task taken up by the neosentimentalist, then, is to develop a theory that will 
preserve the notion that our judgments are ultimately grounded in the emotions, but at the 
same time, explain why our judgments appear to have non-emotional, normative force. 
Neosentimentalists have attacked this challenge from two opposing directions. Some 
argue from a cognitivist perspective, while others support a noncognitivist solution. It 
should be noted that I am using the term “cognitivism” to denote those views that take 
moral judgments to express beliefs. This should not be confused with the psychological 
use of the term “cognitive,” which refers broadly to cognitive states such as beliefs, 
memories, concepts, and so forth. Cognitivists can be either rationalists or sentimentalists 
about moral judgment. The rational cognitivist holds that moral judgments express beliefs 
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about objective moral norms, while the sentimental cognitivist argues that moral 
judgments express beliefs about our sentiments. The particular type of cognitivism I will 
be discussing is sentimental cognitivism.  
According to the cognitivist, moral judgments express beliefs about our 
sentiments (i.e., of approval or disapproval towards something). Beliefs are to be taken at 
face value to assert propositions. Our beliefs are thus truth-apt; that is, they are capable of 
being assessed in terms of truth and falsity. It follows that our moral judgments 
themselves can be either true or false. Two well-known proponents of this view are 
David Wiggins and John McDowell.  
As Wiggins and McDowell see it, both sentiments and beliefs are required in 
order to make moral judgments (Wiggins 1987, McDowell 1994, 1998). Whenever we 
express a sentiment of moral approval or disapproval towards something, the expression 
of the sentiment will always entail a belief indicating that the thing is indeed morally 
wrong. Moral judgment thus consists of a sentiment along with a belief affirming that the 
sentiment merits our approval or disapproval. The belief that the sentiment is warranted is 
truth-apt; that is, the belief is either true or false. It is this quality that gives our moral 
judgments an objective gloss. It should be noted, however, that Wiggins and McDowell 
do not take cognitive judgments such as “wrongness” to be objective or to exist in a 
mind-independent sense. Rather, such judgments depend upon our perception of them for 
their value. Their value is something that we project onto them. Our moral judgments are 
thus still essentially emotional. The explanation is simply not reductive in the same way 
that traditional sentimental theories are (Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton 1997). 
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Non-cognitivism, alternatively, denies the need to appeal to any cognitive states 
such as beliefs in an account of moral judgment. The non-cognitivist, like his expressivist 
predecessors, maintains that our moral judgments express our sentiments of approval or 
disapproval towards things. Since these sentiments are not truth-apt, our moral judgments 
are incapable of being evaluated in terms of truth and falsity. Hence, there are, strictly 
speaking, no such things as moral facts. If, however, our moral judgments do not express 
moral facts, then the non-cognitivist must provide an alternative explanation as to why 
our moral judgments tend to have the same features as claims to objective truth. The non-
cognitivist responds by arguing that our moral judgments are “quasi-objective,” that is, 
there are ways in which our moral judgments mimic objective, factual judgments 
(Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton 1997). Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard formulate 
distinct explanations as to why our moral judgments appear and are discussed as though 
they are objective facts.  
Blackburn’s (1994, 1998) quasi-realist theory holds that moral judgments express 
our attitudes of approval or disapproval towards things. Initially, this is done not with 
moral predicates such as ‘right’ or ‘wrong,’ but rather with emotive predicates like ‘boo!’ 
or ‘hurray!’ So, when we make a judgment such as “boo! killing,” we are really 
projecting an attitude of disapproval towards killing onto an objective event in the world. 
Because these expressions of our attitudes are dependent on facts in the world, they take 
on an air of objectivity. On the surface they appear to us as though our moral judgments 
and assertions really are warranted, factual claims, the truth or falsity of which are 
capable of debate, discussion, etc. While we come to talk about moral claims as if they 
are objective, they are in reality, fundamentally subjective expressions of our sentiments. 
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Gibbard’s (1990) theory of norm expressivism holds that moral judgments 
express our acceptance of norms. Moral judgments, on Gibbard’s account, are judgments 
about the rationality of our sentiments. An action can be judged morally wrong if and 
only if it is rational for the agent to feel guilty about having carried out the act, and for 
others to feel angry or resentful towards the agent for having acted in such a way (Miller 
2003). When described in this way, it is not immediately clear how Gibbard’s view is a 
non-cognitivist one. The non-cognitivist aspect of his theory, however, lies in his analysis 
of rationality. For Gibbard, rationality does not consist in property ascription or truth-
aptness. Rather, to say that something is rational is to express acceptance of a system of 
norms that permit that thing. By “norm,” Gibbard’s does not mean an objective, mind-
independent value. Rather, he explains, a norm is “a possible rule or prescription 
expressible by an imperative…The main thing to be explained is not what a norm is, but 
what “accepting a norm” is—or, more precisely, what it is for something to be permitted 
or required by the norms a person “accepts.” I mean these latter notions to be 
psychological: they are meant to figure in an explanatory theory of human experience and 
action” (Gibbard 1990, p. 46). Since moral judgments are analysed as rational judgments, 
and since Gibbard is a non-cognitivist about rationality, moral judgments themselves are 
non-cognitive.  
While it is clear from this brief survey that cognitivists and non-cognitivists clash 
over the fundamental nature of moral discourse, these neosentimentalist theories remain 
consistent in one important way. Wiggins, McDowell, Blackburn, and Gibbard all adhere 
to some version of what D’arms and Jacobson refer to as the “response dependency 
thesis” or RDT. The crucial idea behind the RDT is that “to think that X has some 
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evaluative property φ is to think it appropriate to feel F in response to X” (D’arms and 
Jacobson 2000, p. 729). In other words, the moral judgment that something is wrong 
amounts to the judgment that the expression of disapproval towards that thing or the 
belief that the thing is wrong is merited, warranted, endorsed, justified, appropriate, and 
so forth.     
Adhering to a RDT raises a serious problem for all of these neosentimentalist 
theories. The problem, as D’arms and Jacobson explain it, is that none of these 
philosophers “has yet sufficiently distinguished the particular species of appropriateness 
of response that is relevant to property ascription—to whether some X is φ” (2000, p. 
731).  Put more simply, the neosentimentalists do not explain what sorts of reasons make 
our moral judgments appropriate. The following example borrowed from D’arms and 
Jacobson helps to clarify the problem. They write (2000, p. 731): 
For instance, imagine that you have a rich and generous but touchy friend, who is 
extremely sensitive about his friends’ attitudes towards his wealth. If he suspects 
you of envying his possessions, he will curtail his largesse. That is a good reason 
not to envy him, if there is any chance whatsoever that you will betray your 
attitude in action or nondeliberate behaviour, but surely it does not speak to 
whether his possessions are enviable. Another reason you might think it 
inappropriate to envy him would be based on moral qualms about being pained at 
a friend’s good fortune, but this seems to irrelevant to the φ property. While such 
good strategic and moral reasons can count in favour of (or against) feeling some 
sentiment, they seem like the wrong kind of endorsement or criticism of it. The 
trouble is that to call a response ‘appropriate’ is vague praise. This is not merely a 
quibble about how well certain philosophers have chosen or defined their terms. 
Whatever one’s preferred normative locution, the point remains that only certain 
good reasons for or against having a response bear on the associated evaluative 
judgment. Until these reasons are identified, there is nothing to stop 
sentimentalism from yielding systematically wrong answers to evaluative 
questions.  
 
This example and the subsequent narrative make it clear how neosentimentalism falls 
victim to the “conflation problem”; neosentimentalists are faced with the difficult 
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challenge of explaining how to differentiate (and hence to avoid conflating) moral and 
prudential reasons for feeling a sentiment from reasons bearing on whether X is φ. 
 Jesse Prinz, in his recent (2006) article titled “The Emotional Basis of Moral 
Judgment,” takes on the task of developing a sentimentalist account of judgment that is 
able to avoid the conflation problem. He argues that recent evidence from cognitive 
neuroscience can be used to confirm the simple sentimentalist claim that moral judgment 
consists in having a sentiment of approbation or disapprobation towards something. If 
empirical evidence can back up the simple sentimentalist thesis, then no metacognitive 
ascent to neosentimentalism is necessary. Since the conflation problem is something that 
affects neosentimentalist theories but not simple sentimentalist views, Prinz can avoid it 
altogether.  
 Although I think that Prinz’s account deserves criticism on metaethical grounds, I 
will not concern myself with constructing a metaethical critique in this paper. What I will 
do, however, is investigate the empirical evidence that Prinz presents in support of his 
sentimentalist theory. My decision to focus on Prinz’s sentimentalist theory is deliberate 
for the following reason. Prinz’s view exemplifies a trend  in contemporary metaethics 
that supposes that neural evidence linking the emotions to moral decision-making 
automatically supports a sentimentalist account of moral judgment (e.g., see also  Nichols 
2004 and forthcoming). I think, however, on closer examination, it becomes clear that the 
neural evidence has been misinterpreted by Prinz and his contemporary sentimentalist 
allies.  
In the following chapter I will argue that although the empirical data Prinz cites is 
incapable of supporting his sentimentalist view, his argument nonetheless reveals some 
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important clues as to how empirical data can effectively be integrated into future 
discussions about moral judgment. Before proceeding with my critique of Prinz’s 





Chapter 2: Prinz’s Sentimentalist View of Moral Judgment 
Prinz’s central claim in “The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments” is that empirical 
evidence gathered from cognitive neuroscience can support a simple sentimentalist view 
of moral judgment. Prinz argues additionally that moral facts are response-dependent and 
that a form of motivational internalism is true. It should be noted that Prinz’s use of the 
term “response-dependent” does not correspond to D’arms and Jacobson’s use of 
“response-dependent.” For Prinz, “response-dependent” is taken to mean that “the bad 
just is that which causes disapprobation in a community of moralizers” (2006, p. 29). On 
D’arms and Jacobson’s use of the term, the bad is that which causes disapprobation 
appropriately in a community of moralizers. While the claims that moral facts are 
response-dependent and that motivational internalism is true are both relevant and 
important to Prinz’s overall view, the critique I offer in the following section will focus 
on his argument for sentimentalism. Before moving forward to my critique, however, I 
would like to open this chapter with a brief summary of Prinz’s article, so his argument 
for sentimentalism may be understood in the correct context.  
 
2.1 A Brief Overview of Prinz’s Position 
In the past, philosophers have attempted to establish a link between emotion and moral 
judgment through reasoned argument and reflection alone. Prinz, however, argues that we 
should appeal to empirical data in order to back up our philosophical intuitions about this 
purported connection. Current evidence, he believes, supports the idea that our moral 
judgments are fundamentally emotional. Prinz opens his article with a review of some 
recent findings from empirical psychology and cognitive neuroscience that corroborate 
three increasingly strong claims about the relationship between emotion and moral 
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judgment. First, he argues that emotions co-occur with moral judgment. Second, he 
asserts that emotions influence and are sufficient for moral judgment. Finally, Prinz 
attempts to show that emotions are necessary for moral judgment. Though Prinz does not 
specify what exactly he means by “necessary,” Jones (2006, p. 46) interprets Prinz as 
arguing that emotion is conceptually necessary for moral judgment (i.e., necessary in all 
possible worlds). I disagree with Jones’ rather strong interpretation, however, and take 
Prinz to be arguing for causal or psychological necessity instead.      
 Although Prinz presents a sizable amount of empirical evidence in support of his 
hypothesis that emotions are correlated to, sufficient for, and necessary for moral 
judgment, he is aware that empirical evidence alone is not demonstrative of a theory of 
moral judgment. He believes, however, that he can back up his sentimentalist thesis 
through further explanation and systematization of these empirical findings. Prinz thus 
proceeds to present a variation of the Humean sentimentalist view of moral judgment, 
which, he argues, can be defended with the empirical evidence he has already drawn to 
our attention. In short, Prinz’s theory says (2006, p. 31): 
To believe that something is morally wrong is to have a sentiment of 
disapprobation towards it. 
 
By “sentiment,” Prinz simply means any disposition to have emotions. To have a 
sentiment of disapprobation towards something is just to be disposed to have a negative 
emotional response towards that thing, that is, to disapprove of it.  
On Prinz’s account, different types of moral transgressions will elicit different 
types of emotional reactions. This claim, he argues, can be backed up by anthropological 
evidence. For instance, Shweder et al. (1997) report that there are three broad categories 
of moral rules: those designed to protect persons, those designed to protect the 
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community, and those pertaining to the perceived natural order. These rules, Prinz notes, 
correspond to different emotions. Crimes against persons incite anger, crimes against the 
community incite contempt, and crimes against nature incite disgust. Prinz argues 
moreover, that we experience emotional reactions to varying degrees. The transgressions 
to which we have a more severe emotional reaction will indicate the corresponding 
severity of the transgression (Prinz 2006, p. 34). 
Similar to McDowell and Wiggins, Prinz argues that our sentiments refer to 
response-dependent properties. That is, when we feel a sentiment of disapprobation 
towards something, we ascribe to that thing the property of causing the disapprobation in 
us. For example, if I say that killing is wrong, I ascribe to the act of killing the property of 
causing anger, remorse, and so forth, in me. Since our moral judgments refer to response-
dependent properties, they are also truth-apt. Prinz’s cognitive stance on the nature of 
moral judgments allows him to avoid the problem facing Blackburn and Gibbard of 
accounting for the apparent objectivity of moral discourse.  
However, since Prinz is defending a simple sentimentalist thesis rather than a 
neosentimentalist one, his account can still be challenged by the same charges that are 
laid against simple sentimentalist theories. The challenge, recall, is for the sentimentalist 
to distinguish between importantly different negative responses (Prinz calls this the 
problem of error) and to account for moral disagreement. As we saw earlier, the 
neosentimentalist can easily deal with these problems by introducing the notion of 
warrant or appropriateness. This metacognitive move, however, leads the 
neosentimentalist directly into the conflation problem. This is something Prinz wants to 
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avoid altogether. He thus responds to the problem of error and the problem of moral 
disagreement without making any metacognitive moves.  
First, Prinz takes on the problem of error. The problem, as Prinz sees it, is that if 
saying something is wrong simply refers to the emotion causing the disapprobation in me 
then it becomes impossible to judge something wrong in error. This consequence, he 
notes, can be avoided if we idealize. That is, we can say that wrong refers only to those 
things that elicit disapprobation in me where I am aware of all of the relevant facts and 
am free from any emotional biases that are unrelated to the matter at hand. Prinz, 
however, chooses to endorse a more straightforward reply. His solution depends on 
drawing a distinction between emotions, which are occurrent states, and sentiments, 
which are dispositions to experience emotions. Basic moral values, argues Prinz, might 
consist in linking a sentiment to a specific kind of action in our long-term memory. For 
instance, we may have a negative sentiment towards cheating. An action, X, may cause 
an emotion of blame because it has been mistaken for an instance of cheating, although in 
reality, it is not. This is an error because X is not an instance of cheating. Our judgment 
that X is wrong is erroneous since we have not established a sentimental policy in our 
long-term memory linking X with the disposition to experience blame (Prinz 2006, p. 
35). According to Prinz, this response to the problem of error allows him to avoid making 
any metacognitive moves, such as idealizing.   
Next, Prinz moves forward to discuss the problem of disagreement. The problem 
is that if saying something is wrong just means than that it is wrong for me, discussions 
about what is actually wrong will be spurious. Prinz offers several responses to this 
challenge. First, if we have the same moral values, then what is wrong for you and what 
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is wrong for me will likely be extensionally equivalent. The debate may turn on a factual 
disagreement rather than a moral one. For example, a disagreement over abortion may be 
a disagreement over what it is to be a person, rather than whether abortion itself is 
morally right or wrong. Second, we have reason to debate moral issues simply because of 
the practical consequences. That is, we need to come to some consensus about issues like 
abortion in order to determine how to deal with the related practical issues such as legal 
rights, and so forth. Debate is a good means for reaching a consensus. Third, we might 
have some shared basic values which we can use to find some common ground. Fourth, 
debates about morality can be considered legitimate because of our tendency to project 
sentimental properties onto the world without realizing or acknowledging that they are 
response-dependent. Finally, the claim that debates about morality are spurious provides 
a reason for why moral debates are often interminable; that is, people reside in unique 
moral spheres (Prinz 2006, p. 36). 
Although this marks the end of Prinz’s defence of sentimentalism, he argues 
further that his sentimentalist view receives additional support from the fact that it is 
capable of explaining three other things that are essential to any account of moral 
judgment. First, Prinz argues that his theory can explain the link between emotion and 
motivation. A sentimentalist view can explain why the move from a moral judgment to 
an action is immediate. In his words (Prinz 2006, p. 36): 
If sentimentalism is true, thinking that an action is wrong disposes one to having 
negative emotions towards it, and negative emotions are inhibitory: they promote 
avoidance, ceasing, intervention, withdrawal, and, when anticipated, preventative 
measures. Beliefs about obligations are not add-ons to beliefs about wrongness; 
beliefs about wrongness carry the motivational force that we experience as being 
under an obligation. Consequently, moral judgments vie for control of the will. 
When they occur, we are thereby motivated to act. 
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Second, Prinz’s sentimentalism can explain how we distinguish between moral 
rules and simple conventions. Moral rules, argues Prinz, are grounded in emotional 
responses, while conventions generally are not. This is how they are distinguished from 
one another. Conventions, says Prinz, that are accompanied by some sort of emotional 
reaction (e.g., things that elicit feelings of disgust) often become moralized. For instance, 
since we have been emotionally conditioned to respect certain rules of etiquette (e.g., it is 
wrong to spit in public), violations of these rules tend to be treated moralistically rather 
than conventionally.  
Third, Prinz believes his theory can reconcile intuitionism with sentimentalism. In 
particular, his sentimentalism can be used to support the intuitionist claim that moral 
judgments are self-justifying. That is, moral judgments do not require independent 
argumentative support. Intuitionists typically base their self-justification claim on the 
phenomenological intuition that moral judgments seem self-evident. Sentimentalism, 
argues Prinz, can bolster this claim. Sentimental judgments, he explains, generally seem 
self-evident. For instance, it is evident that gin and tonic is likeable because it induces 
pleasure when I drink it. Such judgments do not seem to require any more justification 
than this. Moral judgments, argues Prinz, are no different. They have “a perception-like 
immediacy that does not seem to require further support” (Prinz 2006, p. 37). Thus, if 
moral judgments are sentimental and refer to response-dependent properties, then a 
judgment that something is wrong seems self-justifying because such an act elicits a 
negative sentiment expressed by the judgment and having the power to bring out such 
negative sentiments is constitutive of being wrong. 
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After describing the explanatory fruits of his sentimentalist account, Prinz 
evaluates whether or not it is possible to make external moral judgments; that is, moral 
judgments that are not intrinsically motivating. This topic, of course, draws Prinz into the 
long-standing debate between motivational internalists, who believe that it is a matter of 
conceptual necessity that our moral judgments are connected with our actions, and 
motivational externalists, who argue that no necessary connection exists.  
Prinz enters the debate in support of the internalist intuition that there is a 
necessary link between moral judgment and action. He does admit, however, that there 
are instances where we make dispassionate moral judgments. Prinz argues that his 
sentimentalism can allow for two sorts of dispassionate moral judgments. The first kind 
of dispassionate judgment occurs when I have a sentiment but do not manifest it. For 
example, I love chocolate, and although this sentiment is truly self-ascribed, I do not 
always experience a rush of pleasure when I bite into a Crispy Crunch bar. Moreover, I 
can say that killing is wrong even when I am not experiencing feelings of anger or 
outrage. I can make this type of dispassionate judgment because sentiments are emotional 
dispositions, they are not, in and of themselves, occurrent in the way that emotions are. It 
is thus possible to have a sentiment without it being manifested as an occurrent emotion. 
Though the judgment is not immediately motivating, it expresses a dispositional state 
that, under the right circumstances, is motivational.  
It is also possible to ascribe moral judgments dispassionately. We tend to do this 
when we are discussing the moral attitudes of others. Consider, for instance, a tribe that 
endorses polygamy. I could observe the tribe’s marriage practices and infer that the tribe 
members find the practice of polygamy morally commendable. Given the morality of the 
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group, the tribe members ought to be polygamous. This judgment does not, however, 
serve to express my own sentiments. I am expressing a dispassionate judgment about the 
group’s morals, not a dispassionate moral judgment (Prinz 2006, p. 38). 
 Prinz’s sentimentalism therefore shows that there is no such thing as a 
dispassionate moral judgment. All moral judgments are emotionally charged or “hot,” to 
put it in Prinz’s words. As a result, moral judgments are either inherently motivating or 
parasitic (as in the chocolate case) on those that are inherently motivating. This 
conclusion supports motivational internalism. 
 Prinz’s argument for motivational internalism concludes his account of moral 
judgment. In this paper he has argued for the following three interrelated claims: 
sentimentalism is true, moral facts are response-dependent, and motivational internalism 
is true. Although Prinz makes some questionable metaethical moves when defending the 
latter two of these claims, I am more concerned with the support he offers in favour of his 
initial claim, that sentimentalism is true. Unless Prinz can adequately defend simple 
sentimentalism, his arguments for the response-dependence of moral facts and for 
motivational internalism cannot even get off the ground. I do not think that Prinz has 
adequately defended simple sentimentalism. The following section of my paper will be 
devoted to taking up the reasons why I think this is the case.  
 
2.2 Critique of Prinz’s Sentimentalism 
The strength of Prinz’s sentimentalist theory is in his ability to establish a strong 
argument for a link between emotion and moral judgment. The evidence Prinz cites in 
favour of such a link has been taken primarily from experiments in cognitive 
neuroscience designed to monitor brain activity during moral decision-making and other 
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morally relevant tasks. Prinz also presents some anthropological evidence, which has 
been gathered simply through empirical observation of human behaviour. My task in this 
section is to argue that the empirical evidence cited by Prinz establishes neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient connection between emotion and moral judgment. As I 
mentioned earlier, it is my understanding that Prinz is arguing for causal or psychological 
necessity, rather than conceptual necessity. Establishing a necessary and sufficient 
connection between emotion and moral judgment is, on Prinz’s account, imperative for 
his claim that moral judgment is fundamentally emotional. I will begin this section by 
examining Prinz’s arguments for the co-occurrence, sufficiency, and necessity of emotion 
in more detail. Throughout my exposition of these arguments, I will point out some 
critical errors with his evidence as well as with his arguments in general. Following my 
critique, I will explain why I agree with Prinz’s weaker claims, that emotions often co-
occur with and influence moral judgment. The significance of the emotion-judgment 
connection will be further elaborated in the following chapter.  
The claim that emotions typically co-occur with moral judgments is, as Prinz 
explains, not terribly controversial. Brain scans, such as fMRI or PET scans, confirm that 
we typically elicit a negative emotional response when we observe a moral norm being 
violated or when we are required to make moral appraisals. Prinz cites a number of 
findings as evidence for this phenomenon. For example, Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, and 
Eslinger (2003) have found that when subjects make moral judgments, brain areas 
associated with emotional responses are activated. When subjects make strictly factual 
judgments, however, these brain areas are not activated. In a separate study, Sanfey et al. 
(2003) monitored brain activity while subjects played an ultimatum game. When subjects 
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judged that they were being treated inequitably, brain activity was recorded in areas 
associated with emotion. This indicates that inequitable or unfair treatment elicits a 
negative emotional reaction. The findings of Berthoz et al. (2002) indicate that brain 
areas related to emotion are engaged when subjects consider violations of social rules. 
For example, when told a story about a dinner guest who, after tasting the host’s food, 
unapologetically spat it out into his napkin, subjects showed activation in emotional brain 
areas. Greene et al. (2001) have discovered that emotional brain areas are activated when 
subjects are asked to consider moral dilemmas. Finally, Kaplan, Freedman, and Iacoboni 
(forthcoming) have found that emotional brain areas are engaged when subjects view 
pictures of politicians whom they oppose (Prinz 2006, p. 30).  
None of these findings, Prinz recognizes, are all that surprising. Brain scans lend 
empirical support to the observation that emotions typically arise in response to morally 
significant events. Establishing this, however, does not allow Prinz to make any 
metaethical progress. What he must do in order to advance his metaethical argument is 
establish the specific role that emotions play in moral judgment. He thus moves forward 
to defend his second claim, that empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that emotions 
influence and are sufficient for moral judgment.  
Prinz begins by defending the claim that emotions can influence moral judgment. 
This can be established, he argues, by showing that the experience of a negative emotion 
can lead to the construction of a more negative moral appraisal than otherwise would 
have been made. Schnall, Haidt, and Clore’s (forthcoming) findings support this 
hypothesis. They discovered that when subjects are seated in a disgusting environment 
(e.g., at a desk with a chewed pencil, a used tissue, and a greasy pizza box) they tend to 
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rate actions more morally wrong than subjects who are seated in a clean environment. 
Prinz notes, however, that these findings may only establish that emotions can potentially 
draw our attention to the morally salient features of a situation. What he would prefer to 
establish is that emotions are sufficient for moral judgment.   
Prinz argues that Wheatly and Haidt’s (forthcoming) findings provide evidence 
for the sufficiency claim. In their study, Wheatly and Haidt hypnotized subjects to 
experience feelings of disgust whenever they heard the emotionally neutral word “often.” 
This word was then integrated into two separate scenarios. The first scenario described a 
morally reprehensible character, while the second described a morally admirable 
character. Wheatley and Haidt found that the hypnotized subjects judged the actions of 
the morally admirable character to be morally wrong when the word “often” was present 
in the scenario. This, suggests Prinz, shows that the experience of disgust is sufficient to 
make moral judgments.  
Wheatley and Haidt, however, draw a weaker conclusion from these results. In 
their account of the experiment they write, “…participants used their feelings of 
disgust…as information about the wrongness of an act. This finding indicates that gut 
feelings can indeed influence moral judgments” (forthcoming, p.3, emphasis mine). I 
agree that this is the most accurate interpretation of their findings. One reason for this is 
that although the subjects’ judgments were prompted by their feelings of disgust, it is 
doubtful that, were they in a fully informed state, they would maintain their judgment that 
the morally admirable character was, in fact, morally wrong. Karen Jones also makes this 
point in her recent critique of Prinz. She writes (2006, p. 48): 
Sometimes we think we are responding to a morally relevant feature in the world, 
but we are actually only looking at the world through the lens of our disgust, or 
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our shame, and mistakenly supposing the evoking situation to have the kind of 
morally significant features that would warrant those emotions…Normal subjects 
could be expected to say that they thought the action wrong or the person 
reprehensible, but they can now see that there was no basis for this judgment and 
they were mistaken. Subjects would not take the mere fact of their feeling disgust 
to warrant the moral judgment.  
 
That subjects will, in all likelihood, retract their initial claim in a state of full information 
lends support to the idea that emotion can influence moral judgment, though not to the 
notion that they are sufficient for moral judgment. 
It is clear, moreover, that Wheatley and Haidt have a different idea from Prinz of 
how disgust can influence our moral judgments. They argue that individuals use their 
feelings of disgust to inform their moral appraisals. This does not entail, however, that 
this feeling is the only thing informing their judgments. This provides additional 
reinforcement for the idea that emotions have the power to influence moral judgment. It 
does not, however, support the claim that emotions are sufficient for moral judgment. 
Prinz moves forward to cite Murphy, Haidt, and Björkland’s (forthcoming) 
discovery that subjects judge incest to be morally wrong even when they cannot provide 
any independent justification for their belief. The intention of the experimenters was, 
once again, to study the relationship between disgust and negative moral appraisals. In 
their experiment, Murphy, Haidt, and Björkland asked their subjects to justify their belief 
that consensual incest between siblings is wrong. For every justification the subjects 
offered (e.g., because the siblings might have a child with birth defects), Murphy would 
inform them that their reason was irrelevant to the case (e.g., they used two forms of birth 
control). The experimenters report that even when the subjects could think of no more 
reasons justifying their belief, they still insisted that incest was wrong just because it is 
disgusting. That the subjects could not justify their belief rationally yet continued to 
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maintain it is, according to Prinz, evidence that their disgust was sufficient for the moral 
judgment.  
I disagree with Prinz for two reasons. First, Prinz ignores the fact that a portion of 
the subjects did give up their belief that consensual incest is wrong when Murphy 
dismissed the reasons they offered in support of their initial judgment (2006, p. 31). 
Though this does not disprove Prinz’s sufficiency claim, it raises the question of why an 
emotion would be sufficient for moral judgment in some, but not all cases. This is an 
issue that Prinz simply does not address.  
Second, it is possible for a subject’s initial response to a moral transgression to be 
purely emotional. This does not entail, however, that the subject’s response is not guided 
by reasons. It is more likely the case that the subject assumes that her emotions are 
drawing her attention to a morally relevant feature of the situation, which, at present, she 
is incapable of articulating (Jones 2006, p. 50). It is not unusual, moreover, for emotions 
to play this role. Our affective reactions often draw our attention to important features of 
situations without explicitly informing us of the reasons for this. Adolphs (2003), for 
example, argues that disgust is a reaction that evolved in humans to indicate when to 
avoid things that pose a potential threat to our physical health or the health of our 
offspring (e.g., contaminated foods, filthy environments, or incestuous relationships). 
When we experience disgust firsthand, this is, perhaps, the reason why. This reason, 
though not immediately present to our consciousness, does not mean that it is inexistent. 
The reason simply has yet to be articulated. Thus, although the majority of subjects 
resorted to defending the claim that consensual incest is wrong simply because it is 
disgusting, it does not follow from this that their judgment is purely grounded in affect 
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alone. It is entirely possible their disgust is simply drawing their attention to a set of non-
articulated reasons. Although this analysis poses a threat to Prinz’s sufficiency argument, 
it is consistent with his weaker claim that emotion influences moral judgment.  
There is one final point I would like to bring up regarding Prinz’s evidence for 
sufficiency. Suppose, for a moment, that we grant that these disgust-based studies support 
Prinz’s claim. Disgust is sufficient for moral appraisals. What exactly would this prove 
about the relationship between emotion and moral judgment? Prinz provides no evidence 
that the experience of any emotions other than disgust would lead to the same effect. In 
fact, since emotions of disgust and anger are linked to a completely different brain region 
than emotions of sadness or fear (i.e., disgust and anger are associated with activity in the 
insula while sadness and fear are associated with activity in the amygdala), there is, I 
think, quite good reason to doubt that these findings could be repeated in studies of 
alternative emotions. Thus, even if disgust is sufficient for moral judgment, it is far from 
clear that emotion, in general, will be.   
I will now move forward to discuss Prinz’s claim that emotions are necessary for 
moral judgment. Prinz provides evidence for this claim in three separate ways. First, 
Prinz argues that emotions are necessary for moral development. This, he thinks, is 
because the techniques that parents use to convey moral rules all engage emotions. These 
techniques (e.g., threatening the child with harm to elicit fear) condition the child to 
experience negative emotions in conjunction with misdeeds. The emotional response 
(e.g., fear) serves the purpose of instilling the rule that is to be obeyed in the child.  
This piece of evidence, I argue, is irrelevant to necessity. What this example does 
show is that negative emotions typically accompany the infraction of moral norms when 
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they are conditioned to do so. This example is not successful, however, in demonstrating 
that children must experience affective reactions in conjunction with moral infractions, 
nor does it bolster the claim that emotions are necessary for moral judgment.  
Prinz thinks that stronger support for the link between emotion and moral 
development can be derived from Blair and his colleagues’ research on psychopathy 
(1995, 1997, 2001, 2002). Psychopaths, explains Prinz, have been found to rarely 
experience negative emotions such as fear or sadness and have trouble recognizing these 
emotions in the speech and facial expressions of others. According to Blair and his 
colleagues’ experiments, psychopaths experience pain less intensely than normal subjects 
and are not disturbed by emotionally charged images in the same way as non-
psychopathic subjects (1995, 1997, 2001, 2002). This evidence, argues Prinz, indicates 
that psychopathy results from a low-level deficit in negative emotions. In the absence of 
negative emotions, psychopaths cannot experience empathetic distress, remorse, or guilt. 
Since these core emotions are necessary for the normal development of moral concepts, 
psychopaths are incapable of acquiring the ability to distinguish between conventional 
and moral misdeeds. According to Prinz, this evidence supports the thesis that emotion is 
necessary for moral development. This, in turn, lends indirect support to the idea that 
emotions are necessary for moral judgment in general. 
The principle difficulty with Prinz’s psychopathy evidence is that he conveniently 
omits findings which contradict his claim. While Blair did discover that psychopaths find 
it difficult to recognize facial expressions and sounds related to fear and sadness, he also 
found that they recognize emotions such as anger and disgust as readily as non-
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psychopathic subjects. In a recent study, for instance, Blair writes (2001, p. 493, 
emphasis mine):  
Psychopathic adults and children with psychopathic tendencies show reduced skin 
conductance to sad, but not angry expressions. Moreover, children with 
psychopathic tendencies have been found to show selective recognition 
difficulties for sad and fearful expressions but not for angry, disgusted, surprised, 
or happy expressions. 
 
The reason that psychopaths are incapable of recognizing anger and disgust but not fear 
and sadness is perhaps because these emotions are associated with different areas of the 
brain. Psychopathy is a disorder related to underdevelopment in the amygdala. Since fear 
and sadness are associated specifically with amygdala function, it makes sense that these 
emotions are impaired. Anger and disgust, however, are associated with activation in the 
insula (Wicker et al. 2003, p. 655). Because the insula is not impaired in psychopaths, a 
psychopath’s recognition of anger and disgust should, likewise, be unimpaired (Blair 
2002, p. 682). Prinz, recall, argues that emotions are necessary for moral development. 
This is meant to support the fact that emotions are necessary for moral judgment. If 
psychopathic individuals process and experience emotions such as anger and disgust 
normally then their moral development and moral judgment, in relation to these 
emotions, ought to be unimpaired. This, however, is not the case. The fact that 
psychopathic individuals have an underdeveloped capacity for moral decision-making 
and judgment, even in cases related specifically to emotions like anger, seems to indicate 
that emotions may not necessarily play a role in moral development or moral judgment. 
At the very least, this evidence has the power to directly undermine Prinz’s sufficiency 
claim.   
 37
Prinz defends his claim that emotions are necessary for moral judgment in a 
second way by contending that emotions are necessary in a synchronic sense. This means 
that when we sincerely judge that something is wrong we are necessarily disposed to 
have a negative emotion towards that thing. For example, although it is possible to say 
that killing is wrong and to justify this assertion with non-emotional reasons (e.g., it 
diminishes utility), it is improper to say that someone actually believes killing to be 
wrong in the absence of a strong negative sentiment towards killing. Alternatively, if 
someone has a strong sentiment of disapprobation towards killing, it would be proper to 
say that the individual believes killing is wrong even if they cannot rationally justify their 
belief. Though Prinz offers no empirical evidence as support for this claim, he is 
confident that neuroscientific trials will be developed in the near future to test and 
confirm his thesis that emotions are necessary for moral judgment.  
Although Prinz admits that there is no empirical evidence to appeal to in support 
of this claim, I argue that there is an abundance of empirical evidence supporting the 
opposite conclusion that we often sincerely judge things to be wrong without 
experiencing any obvious negative affect. Moreover, we can have a strong feeling of 
disapproval towards something without believing that it merits a negative moral 
appraisal. Evidence for both of these claims can be drawn from everyday experience.  
In the case of unemotional judgments, consider the activity of voting. Some 
individuals, of course, will vote for a specific candidate for emotional reasons. Perhaps 
one of the candidates is a strong supporter of capital punishment while his opponent is 
firmly against the death penalty. If the idea of capital punishment elicits a feeling of 
distress or disgust within the voter, they may choose to vote for the candidate who 
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opposes the death penalty. In this case, the voter is making an overtly emotional 
judgment.  But there are also individuals who decide which candidate to vote for in an 
unemotional, calculated manner. If the voter has no emotional connection to any 
particular candidate or their policies then the voter will probably make their decision by 
weighing one candidate’s social or economic plans against the other candidate’s 
proposals in a cold, mathematical manner. This is not to say that the eventual judgment 
will be entirely unemotional. The example is simply meant to demonstrate that our moral 
judgments need not be obviously emotional or attributable to explicitly emotional 
reasons.   
Good examples can also be found in favour of the corresponding claim that we 
can strongly disapprove of something without making a negative moral appraisal. 
Consider, for instance, smoking. Every time I see someone light up a cigarette, I feel 
sincerely disgusted. I do not, however, consider smoking to be morally reprehensible. In 
fact, I do not find smoking morally relevant at all, even though it has the power to cause 
me to experience a feeling of negative affect. Smoking is, in my opinion, simply gross. 
These two examples, it seems, contradict Prinz’s necessity claim. It is possible to have a 
sincere emotional reaction to something without making a corresponding moral appraisal. 
It is likewise possible to form unemotional moral judgments. This supports the 
conclusion that emotion is not necessary for moral judgment. 
Finally, Prinz argues that his necessity claim is strengthened by the fact that 
emotions are necessary for the establishment of moral values. If moral judgments were 
based on something like reason or observation, then we ought to see more moral 
convergence across cultures. Reason and observation, contends Prinz, tend to converge 
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over time. The fact that moral values are incredibly divergent cross-culturally indicates 
that moral values do not have a purely cognitive source. The diversity of moral values 
therefore provides indirect evidence that emotions are necessary for the construction of 
moral values (Prinz 2006, p. 33). Since a grasp of moral values plays an integral role in 
moral judgment, it follows that emotions are necessary for moral judgment as well.   
Why Prinz believes that reason and observation lead to convergence over time is 
unclear. First, he does not explain exactly what he means by saying that reason and 
observation converge over time. Moreover, even if we accept that they do converge, 
Prinz does not explain how this convergence would be measured. Second, and more 
importantly, Prinz’s presupposition that reason and emotion are distinct is empirically 
ungrounded. So, too, is his claim that emotion is divergent and reason convergent. Prinz 
is unsuccessful in establishing any definitive link between emotion and moral diversity.  
My examination of the empirical evidence marshalled for Prinz’s sufficiency and 
necessity arguments has hopefully made it clear that his account is fundamentally flawed. 
My critique has also shown, however, that not all of Prinz’s claims are inaccurate. I think 
that there is good reason to accept his argument that emotions often co-occur with and 
influence moral judgment. Evidence for this can be found in cognitive neuroscience, 
where experiments reliably show that tasks related to moral judgment and decision-
making activate areas of the brain that are associated with emotional experience (see, for 
instance, Greene and Haidt 2002, Casebeer and Churchland 2003).  
This additional evidence, combined with the evidence Prinz’s offers is, I believe, 
ample to support the claim that emotions often co-occur with and influence moral 
judgment. Neural evidence does not entail, however, that emotions are either necessary or 
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sufficient for moral judgment. Since both simple sentimentalist and neosentimentalist 
theories of judgment demand a causal role for emotion when making moral appraisals, 
the conclusions that I have drawn in this section appear to pose a problem for 
sentimentalist views in general. Should these neuroscientific findings then be taken 
alternatively, to support a rationalist account of moral judgment? In the final section of 
my paper, I will argue that neural evidence does not favour a rationalist account of 
judgment any more than it does a sentimentalist one. This, I think, is because 
neuroscience presents a very different account than traditional philosophical and 
psychological theories do of what emotions are. By discussing an alternative view of 
emotions, I hope to show how neuroscience could have a positive effect on future debates 
about moral judgment in metaethics. Improvement and progress in metaethics, however, 
will likely require philosophers to relinquish some of their dogmatic beliefs about the 




Chapter 3: Implications for Future Theories of Moral Judgment 
In the previous section, I outlined and criticized Prinz’s theory of moral judgment. I have 
argued that moral judgment is often accompanied by emotions and capable of being 
influenced by emotions. This much seems undisputable. What I have argued against is 
Prinz’s assertion that emotions are necessary for moral judgment and that emotions are 
sufficient for moral judgment. In my critique, I focused primarily on criticizing Prinz’s 
interpretation and use of neuroscientific evidence. There is, however, an additional reason 
for criticizing Prinz’s necessity and sufficiency arguments. This criticism is related to 
assumptions he makes regarding the nature of emotion. In order to explain why Prinz’s 
sentimentalist thesis fails in this respect, I must first provide a brief outline of his theory 
of emotion.  
 
3.1 Prinz’s Theory of Emotion 
 
Prinz’s view of emotional consciousness is not revolutionary. It is a variation of the view 
proposed by James and Lange (1922) which has recently been revived by Damasio in 
what he calls the “somatic-marker” hypothesis (1994). According to this tradition of 
thought, emotions are simply “perceptions of patterned changes in the body.” They are, 
as Prinz puts it, “gut reactions” (Prinz 2004, p. viii). Views that claim that emotions are 
fundamentally feelings of changes in our physiology are typically referred to as somatic 
theories of emotion. Alternatively, views that argue that emotions are attributable to some 
sort of disembodied judgment or propositional attitude are typically called cognitive 
appraisal theories of emotion.  
Prinz labels his view an “embodied appraisal theory of emotion.” An appraisal, 
explains Prinz, is “a representation of the relationship between an organism and its 
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environment that bears on well-being” (2004, p. 51). Cognitive appraisal theories, of 
course, tend to view this representation as a disembodied mental event. Prinz disagrees. 
He argues that such representations can be “inextricably bound up with states that are 
involved in the detection of bodily changes” (Prinz 2004, p. 52). Prinz’s aim is to develop 
a theory which accepts that emotions are appraisals, yet at the same time asserts that 
appraisals are grounded in our embodied perception of physiological changes.  
In order for Prinz to establish that emotions are appraisals, he must first establish 
that emotions are mental representations. A mental representation, according the 
Dretskean account that Prinz defends, is just a mental state that satisfies two conditions. 
First, the mental state will carry information about something that reliably causes it to 
occur. Second, the mental state must be capable of being erroneously applied (Prinz 
2004, p. 53). Consider, for example, my concept representing dogs. My concept of dogs 
is reliably caused or set up by my various encounters with dogs. A mental state reliably 
caused by dogs, however, could also be reliably caused by a similar animal, like a wolf. 
Since dogs and wolves look similar, any mental state caused by a dog could also, on 
occasion, be caused by a wolf. As a consequence, a dog concept will carry information 
about both dogs and wolves. It is thus possible to fall into error when my dog concept is 
activated in response to a wolf. Since, however, my dog concept was acquired 
specifically for the function of carrying information about dogs, it represents dogs and 
dogs only. If a wolf activates my dog concept, that response is considered erroneous and 
does not count as a representation.  
Prinz’s task is to show that emotions can act as representations in a similar 
fashion. He must explain how emotions can carry information and that they can likewise 
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be erroneously applied. Emotions, Prinz argues, are reliably caused by our perception of 
bodily changes. Emotions are “states within our somatosensory systems that register 
changes in our bodies” (Prinz 2004, p. 57). Being able to register changes in our bodies, 
however, is not the same as representing changes in our bodies. So, if emotions do not 
represent changes in our physiology, what do they represent? According to Prinz, 
emotions represent things external to us, or more specifically, relations between external 
states and ourselves. Emotions represent what Prinz calls “organism-environment” 
relations (2004, p. 60). 
This does not mean that emotions represent particular events or things. Rather, 
argues Prinz, they represent the “formal objects” of emotion. The formal object of an 
emotion “is the property in virtue of which an event elicits an emotion” (Prinz 2004, p. 
62). Consider, for example, my expression of sadness over the death of a loved one. The 
emotion, sadness, represents the loss of something that I value. The property of loss is the 
formal object of my emotion. The event that elicits the emotion, the death of a loved one, 
for instance, is the “particular object” of my emotion. Emotions represent the formal but 
not particular objects.   
On Prinz’s interpretation, it follows that emotions represent “core relational 
themes.” Core relational themes are “relational properties that pertain to well-being” 
(Prinz 2004, p. 66). Since emotions represent core relational themes, that means they are 
reliably caused by core relational themes. Consider, once more, the example of feeling 
sadness over the death of a loved one. The emotion, sadness, is reliably caused by the 
loss of something that I value. Loss is a relational property that links my well-being to 
some thing or event external to me that is of value, e.g., the death of a loved one.  
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This raises the question, however, of why emotions are set up for this purpose. 
Why do emotions have the function of being caused by core relational themes? 
According to Prinz, it makes sense for emotions to have this function from an 
evolutionary perspective. Emotions track core relational themes because it helps confer a 
survival advantage and is consistent with individual needs and interests (Prinz 2004, p. 
66). Although emotions can be reliably caused by both bodily changes and core relational 
themes, our emotions only detect core relational themes. Their function is to represent 
core relational themes, in the same way that a dog concept functions to represent dogs 
and dogs alone. Emotions do this in spite of the fact that they, like dog concepts, can be 
reliably caused by other things, such as physiological changes or seeing a wolf. Prinz 
explains further that (2004, p. 68):    
The dog genome, or any other property essential to being a dog, can be called the 
“real content” of a dog concept. The features by which we detect dogs can be 
called the “nominal content” of our dog concepts…[Emotions] represent core 
relational themes, but they do so by perceiving bodily changes. Core relational 
themes are the real contents of emotions, and bodily changes are their nominal 
contents.   
 
Prinz distinguishes between the real contents and the nominal contents of emotions in 
order to reinforce the notion that core relational themes do not carry out a descriptive 
function. In Prinz’s words (2004, p. 65): 
Core relational themes do not capture the structure of our emotions or the 
structure of any other mental representations that are necessary concomitants of 
emotions. We can form the judgment that there has been an irrevocable loss, but 
we seldom do. Sadness can occur without that judgment. But sadness represents 
what the judgment represents. It has the same meaning but a different form.  
 
Emotions thus function to represent core relational themes without explicitly describing 
them. They track physiological states that reliably co-occur with significant organism-
environment relations. It follows that emotions also reliably co-occur with organism-
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environment relations. To recap, then, emotions both monitor internal physiological 
changes and detect external dangers, threats, losses, and other matters of significance. 
Emotions use our bodies to convey information about how we are faring in the world 
(Prinz 2004, p. 74).    
 Prinz’s final task is to explain what sort of inner state detects the external object 
or event and then causes the physiological change to take place. In other words, he must 
isolate the inner cause of emotions.  Prinz argues that the inner cause of emotions is some 
sort of perceptual state. Even learned emotional responses are generally perceptually 
mediated. So, for example, if you experience disgust at the sight of a food that made you 
sick in the past, this is because your brain has associated a perceptual state (e.g., seeing 
the food) with an emotional response that occurred in conjunction with that perceptual 
state (e.g., disgust) (Prinz 2004, p. 75). Likewise, emotions can also be triggered by 
cognitive states like mental images, since cognitive states are, Prinz argues, nothing more 
than mental representations under organismic control. A link will be formed in memory 
between an emotion and the representation of the particular object that elicited it (Prinz 
2004, p. 75). In summary, Prinz writes (2004, p. 240): 
Having an emotion is literally perceiving our relationship to the world…They can 
deliver information that helps us assess how we are faring. They often allow us to 
pick up this information before we have made any pertinent judgments...When we 
listen to our emotions we are not being swayed by meaningless feelings. Nor are 
we hearing the cold dictates of complex judgments. We are using our bodies to 
perceive our position in the world. 
 
3.2 Problems with Somatic and Cognitive Theories of Emotion 
I have already argued against Prinz’s interpretation of the neural evidence he uses to 
bolster his claim that emotion is both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. I have 
 46
also argued affirmatively that emotions often co-occur with and influence moral 
judgment. I will now explain in more detail, how and why I think emotions are important 
for moral judgment. The plausibility of my explanation will depend largely on the 
account of emotion that underlies my ideas about moral judgment.   
 In the previous section I offered a brief overview of Prinz’s theory of emotion. 
Prinz’s view, like the views of his predecessors, James, Lange, and Griffiths (1997), is a 
somatic theory of emotion. Prinz, however, labels his view an “embodied appraisal 
theory of emotion,” which is slightly misleading. For Prinz an appraisal is just an 
organism’s perception of the relationship between its self and its environment that is 
relevant to its well-being (2004, p. 51). This differs drastically from the sense of appraisal 
intended by those who endorse cognitive appraisal theories of emotion. In the context of 
these theories an appraisal represents some sort of mental event such as a judgment or a 
belief (see, for instance, Nussbaum 2001, Oatley 1992, 2004, Lazarus 1994, Scherer 
1998, Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1998). Thus, although Prinz alludes to the notion that 
his theory integrates aspects of both somatic and cognitive appraisal theories, it is nothing 
more than a basic somatic theory. Emotions, on his account, are just perceptions of 
changes in our bodily state.  
 The problem with somatic theories like Prinz’s is that they exclude or 
deemphasize important cognitive aspects of emotional experience. Emotions are 
produced not merely by perceiving our changing internal physiological states or our 
changing external relationships with the environment. Our perceptions of our 
physiological states and of our surroundings are, of course, integral to the production of 
emotions. Somatic theories, however, fail to explain how the brain makes use of this 
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information in order to assess how we are faring in the world. Somatic information 
requires cognitive factors such as attention, judgment, memory, belief, desire, and reason 
to accumulate, disentangle, and interpret bodily inputs.   
 Cognitive appraisal theories, unfortunately, fare no better. While these theories do 
emphasise the important role that thoughts and other cognitive factors play in emotions, 
they leave no room for physiological factors in their accounts. Though they allow that 
bodily changes or environmental changes often play a part in emotional experiences as a 
whole, they argue that the fundamental aspects of emotion (i.e., the ability to assess one’s 
overall situation) are strictly cognitive. 
 Prinz argues that moral judgment is fundamentally emotional. Emotions, he says, 
are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. This claim, however, must be 
considered in light of my discussion of Prinz’s view of emotion. First, his view that 
emotions are merely perceptions of changing bodily states is too simplistic to serve as a 
foundation for a theory of moral judgment. Moral judgment is too complex a 
phenomenon for a somatic theory of emotion to account for alone. Second, I think that 
Prinz is mistaken in employing terms such as “necessity” or “sufficiency” in this type of 
debate in the first place. Using these terms reinforces the philosophical presupposition 
that the relationship between emotion and moral judgment must be a logical one. It 
moreover reinforces the philosophical presupposition that emotion and reason are 
fundamentally distinct.   
I think that it is more appropriate to view the relationships between reason, 
emotion, and moral judgment in terms of degrees as opposed to absolutes. For instance, 
some moral judgments might be overwhelmingly emotional. This, however, does not 
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mean that they are not cognitive. Other judgments might be highly calculated, but this 
does not mean that emotion plays no role whatsoever in the process. By avoiding logical 
presuppositions such as “necessity” or “sufficiency”, room is left for cases where, 
perhaps, an individual learns (e.g., after years of meditation) to make a moral judgment 
that is completely unemotional.     
 Developing a theory of moral judgment that is capable of integrating cognitive 
and somatic factors is a possibility. Such a theory, however, will require an account of 
emotion that integrates aspects from both cognitive appraisal theories and somatic 
theories of emotion. These theories are not, in fact, inconsistent as many of their 
proponents believe. With an integrated account of emotion, it is possible to defend a 
theory of moral judgment that views emotions as vital for making moral appraisals. 
Before explaining in detail how such a proposal is possible, I would like to explore what 
an integrated account of emotion might look like.  
 
3.3 The Solution: An Integrated Theory of Emotional Consciousness  
A possible candidate for resolving the tension between somatic and cognitive theories of 
emotion is Thagard’s (forthcoming) neurocomputational account of emotional 
consciousness. On this account, emotions are “neural processes that represent the overall 
cognitive and somatic state of the organism” (Thagard forthcoming, p. 1). Thagard’s 
model, EMOCON for short, explains how different brain areas integrate perceptions of an 
individual’s physiological states with cognitive appraisals of their current situation 
through working memory, in order to produce conscious, emotional experience. 
EMOCON includes the following components: representation, sensory processes, 
cognitive appraisal, and working memory.  
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 A model of emotional consciousness must include an explanation of how the 
brain is able to represent the world, bodily states, and its own representations. Thagard 
suggests that Eliasmith and Anderson’s (2003) account of representation is consistent 
with his theory. As Thagard explains it, the world has a causal effect on an organism’s 
sense organs, which produces neural signals that generate patterns of firing in groups of 
interconnected neurons (i.e., neural populations). A neural population represents objects 
or events in the world by means of the causal correlation between its firing patterns and 
the object or event (Thagard forthcoming, p. 7). 
In the same way that organisms have sense organs to detect outer states, they also 
have internal sensors that detect inner bodily states. Neural populations represent inner 
bodily states in basically the same way that they represent external aspects of the world 
(Thagard forthcoming, p. 8). The only difference is that the neural signals are not 
generated directly by an external cause.  
Finally, it is also possible for neural populations to respond to alternate neural 
populations in order to generate more complex representations. Complex representations 
are necessary in order for an organism to be capable of the kind of higher-order thought 
that is required for more sophisticated decision-making and deliberative tasks. It should 
be noted additionally that these neural populations do not fire signals in one direction 
only (Thagard forthcoming, p. 9). Rather, the brain is made up of feedback connections, 
which enable neural populations to send signals in both directions (e.g., signals can be 
sent from a neural population back to an organism’s internal or external sensors).  
According to Thagard, a model of emotional consciousness must also include an 
explanation of the brain areas related to emotions and how they interact. Thagard’s 
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explanation begins with an explanation of Litt, Eliasmith, and Thagard’s (2006, 
forthcoming) model of emotional decision making. The model is known as ANDREA, 
for short. In their view, all decision making “has an emotional component that involves 
the interaction of at least seven major brain areas that contribute to valuation of potential 
actions” (Thagard forthcoming, p. 9-10). These brain areas are the amygdala, the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFPFC), the anterior cingulate cortex, the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC), the ventral striatum, the midbrain dopaminergic neurons, and the 
serotonergic neurons found in the dorsal raphe nucleus of the brainstem. For brevity’s 
sake, I will not elaborate on the specific functions of these emotional brain areas, though 
their roles are thoroughly explained in a variety of psychological studies (see, for 
instance, Rolls 2005). 
 In addition to the seven brain areas modeled in ANDREA, the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and the hippocampus will also play a role in an account of 
emotional consciousness. The VMPFC provides important connections between the 
orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala. The hippocampus is related to memory and the 
ability to contextualize in decision making. These two additional areas are represented in 
Wagar and Thagard’s (2004) model known as GAGE. Last, Thagard argues that Morris’ 
(2002) findings related to the thalamus and insula are relevant to a model of emotional 
consciousness. The thalamus and insula are important because of their role in sending and 
receiving somatic information (Thagard forthcoming, p. 12).    
 Any account of emotional consciousness must also give an explanation of how 
and where cognitive appraisals are performed in the brain. That is, how and where does 
the brain make use of perceptual and somatic information, as well as accumulated 
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knowledge, in order to assess its overall current state? Thagard notes that Nerb’s 
(forthcoming) model construes appraisal “as a kind of parallel constraint satisfaction 
accomplished by artificial neural networks using localist representations” (Thagard 
forthcoming, p. 12). Emotions and goal-relevant elements are represented in this context 
by single artificial neurons. Although Thagard agrees that appraisal should be construed 
as some sort of parallel constraint satisfaction, he does not endorse a localist account of 
representation. For this reason, Thagard chooses to support Aubie and Thagard’s 
(forthcoming-a) program, NECO, which is able to “show how parallel constraint 
satisfaction can be performed by distributed representations using large numbers of 
neurons” (forthcoming, p. 13). A distributed model such as NECO, of course, is more 
neurologically realistic than a localist representation such as Nerb’s. Aubie and Thagard 
(forthcoming-b) are presently extending their distributed model to perform appraisal of 
emotional situations, “including both cognitive appraisal with respect to goals and 
somatic information provided via the amygdala and insula” (Thagard forthcoming, p. 13). 
 The final component needed for a plausible theory of emotional consciousness is 
an account of working memory. Thagard describes three candidates for such an 
explanation. First, Smith and Jonides (1999) propose that working memory “involves 
both short-term storage of different kinds of information in different brain areas and 
executive processes of selective attention and task management that involve the anterior 
cingulate and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex” (Thagard forthcoming, p. 13). Second, 
Eliasmith and Anderson (2003) “describe how working memory can be modelled by 
transformations of neural representations” (Thagard forthcoming, p. 13). Third, Aubie 
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and Thagard (forthcoming-a, b) argue that working memory can be used to “provide a 
binding between cognitive and affective representations” (Thagard forthcoming, p. 14). 
 After describing the various mechanisms and components necessary to explain 
various emotional phenomena, Thagard explains how these elements are combined in 
EMOCON in order to produce an integrated account of emotional consciousness. His 
neurocomputational model incorporates ideas from the ANDREA, GAGE, and NECO 
models as well as Morris’ (2002) observations about sensory inputs. Thagard conjectures 
that emotional experience results from interactions among all of the elements related to 
representation, sensory processes, cognitive appraisal, and working memory 
(forthcoming, p.  14). The interactions between these various elements are represented 
below in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2: The 








The EMOCON model illustrates how emotions are not merely perceptions of 
changing physiological states in relation to our environment. Emotions, moreover, are not 
merely cognitive appraisals of our current overall situations. Rather, writes Thagard, 
emotions are patterns of neural activity in the whole system. This includes inputs from 
internal bodily states and external senses (forthcoming, p. 16). It should also be noted that 
the diagram presents a number of feedback loops. This is important because it emphasises 
the fact that emotional consciousness is not represented as an output from any particular 
brain area. Rather, the diagram is designed to show emotional consciousness as simply 
“the overall neural process that takes place in interacting brain areas” (Thagard 
forthcoming, p. 16). 
 Before moving forward, I would like to clarify that I have chosen Thagard’s 
theory merely as an example of how an integrative account of emotional consciousness 
might be possible. A degree of speculation surrounds some of the mechanisms within the 
EMOCON model. My purpose, however, is not to offer a critical analysis of Thagard’s 
view, but rather to highlight how an integrative theory might be developed to resolve the 
difficulties that face cognitive appraisal theories and somatic theories respectively. I will 
now explain how I think such a theory can have a positive effect on debates about the 
nature of moral judgment.  
 
3.4 How Might an Integrated Theory of Emotion Impact Future Debates over the 
Nature of Moral Judgment in Philosophy and Psychology?  
I believe that an integrated account of emotional consciousness makes it possible to 
defend a philosophical or psychological stance that takes emotions to be a vital 
component of moral judgment. If emotion is understood as Thagard proposes (i.e., simply 
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as “neural processes that represent the overall cognitive and somatic state of the 
organism”), it becomes clear why emotion must play an integral role in moral judgment. 
Emotion is vital for moral judgment because all judgments, moral or otherwise, are 
typically emotional.  
In order to better understand why moral judgment is typically emotional, I think it 
will be helpful to examine the notion of moral judgment itself. What actually occurs 
when we are making a moral judgment? Initially, of course, we either perceive an event 
unfolding in the world or recall an event that previously occurred. After perceiving or 
recalling such an event, the event becomes represented within the brain’s working 
memory. The representations of the event begin cycling through feedback loops in the 
brain, combining with representations about our changing physiological states, 
representations of beliefs, representations of goals, along with a variety of other sorts of 
representations. The cycling of these representations between neural populations in the 
anterior cingulate cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, dopamine system, orbitofrontal 
cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, insula, amygdala, and thalamus is the basic stuff 
of conscious thought, decision-making, and judgment. This cycle is likewise the basic 
stuff of emotional consciousness. The process that generates moral appraisals is 
simultaneously generating emotions. Moral judgments just are emotional experiences. 
Emotion is thus vital for moral judgment because when a brain generates a moral 
judgment it will be generated from the same circuit that also generates emotional 
experience.            
 If we accept that emotion is vital for moral judgment, might this imply a victory 
for sentimentalism? The short answer is probably not. How, then, will an integrative 
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theory of emotional consciousness affect contemporary debates about the nature of moral 
judgment? This question can be answered in a number of ways.  
 First, adopting a view that takes emotion and cognition to be intrinsically linked 
in consciousness has the power to bridge the longstanding divide between rationalism and 
sentimentalism in both philosophy and psychology. This is certainly not to say that either 
side has been defeated. Rather, each side can be confident in the fact that they have 
gotten part of the moral judgment story correct. Introducing an integrative theory of 
emotional consciousness to the debate will enable thinkers on either side to understand 
that they need not adhere exclusively to one view or the other. Accepting that cognition 
and emotion coexist rather than conflict will open the door for a number of new 
collaborations within these fields of study. This will allow progress to be made on other 
underexamined aspects of moral judgment. An integrative account of emotional 
consciousness will enable us to move past debates over whether moral judgment is 
fundamentally cognitive or sentimental. It has the power to encourage and inspire new 
discussions about morality in general.  
 A second upshot of an integrative account of emotional consciousness is that it 
has the potential to influence debates related to moral motivation. The literature on moral 
motivation has traditionally considered emotion to be inherently motivating. This has 
generally given sentimentalist theories of judgment the upper hand when it comes to 
explaining action. If, however, we accept that moral judgments are typically emotional, it 
follows that we must also reconsider our views about moral motivation within this new 
framework and in absence of any philosophical presuppositions.  
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Finally, adopting a novel view of emotion may encourage both philosophers and 
psychologists to develop empirically informed theories of moral judgment that are 
consistent with contemporary research in both experimental psychology and cognitive 
neuroscience about the nature of consciousness. It is important, however, that researchers 
in the humanities strive to integrate empirical data in their theories in an objective, non-
biased manner. Experimental results can be a powerful form of evidence for one’s 
theoretical intuitions. Empirical evidence, however, is terribly ineffective when it is 














My intention in writing this thesis was to draw attention to a developing trend in ethical 
philosophy. This trend is to use empirical evidence about the human brain to support 
philosophical explanations of moral reasoning. The difficulty that arises is that writers, 
such as Prinz, for instance, have a tendency to misinterpret neural findings or exclude 
findings from their theories that might contradict their own views. They are providing 
subjective interpretations of empirical data so that it fits with their ethical 
presuppositions. What writers like Prinz ought to be doing instead is revising their 
philosophical intuitions in light of developments in the empirical sciences.  
 My suggestion in this thesis is that an objective interpretation of recent neural 
evidence indicates that traditional beliefs about the nature of emotion are fundamentally 
mistaken. This evidence reveals that emotion is not reducible to either the perception of a 
somatic state or a cognitive appraisal of one’s overall situation alone. Rather, it suggests 
that emotional experience is generated by a complex interplay of cognitive appraisals, 
sensory processes, and representations in our working memory. Reconstruing emotional 
consciousness in this manner, I have argued, could have a profound influence on 
philosophical and psychological debates about the fundamental nature of moral 
judgment. In fact, an integrative account of emotional consciousness could potentially 
bridge the gap between rationalist theories and sentimentalist theories of moral judgment.  
 My proposal, however, is not without its own difficulties. First, I would like to 
clarify that I do not think that neuroscience alone can be relied on to solve philosophical 
problems. Rather, it should be used as a resource for developing empirically-informed 
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philosophical theories. This applies not only to theories of moral judgment, but to other 
philosophical problems as well.  
Moreover, while great progress has recently been made in the field of cognitive 
neuroscience, we must remember that many neuroscientific theories are themselves 
speculative. Given that neural researchers are continually improving the methods and the 
apparatuses they use to study the brain, it is certain that contemporary neural theories will 
likewise improve and evolve in the future. When such change does occur, we must also 
be prepared to rethink our philosophical ideas accordingly.  
 What my thesis has shown, most importantly, is how allowing alternative 
disciplines to influence long-standing philosophical debates can generate fresh ideas and 
encourage the development of new theories. This is not to say that our traditional 
philosophical views about issues like moral judgment are fundamentally mistaken. I 
simply wish to emphasize that it is often when we view philosophical problems from an 
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